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FLORIDA'S ADHERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF
NONDELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
CARL J. PECKINPAUGH, JR.
Like the United States Constitution and those of most states, the
Florida Constitution separates the powers of government into three
branches: the legislative, executive, and judicial.' However, in this
respect the Florida Constitution is more emphatic than most in that
it expressly provides that "[n]o person belonging to one branch
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein."2 When this section is
read together with other provisions of the Florida Constitution
which vest the legislative power of the state in the legislature,3 the
supreme executive power in the Governor,' and the judicial power
in the courts,' one result is a dQctrinal prohibition of the delegation
of legislative power to an agency.' Therefore, the legislature may not
delegate to any agency the power to set policies or "to declare what
the law shall be." 7 A closely related, but less commonly litigated
doctrine prohibits the legislature from delegating judicial power to
an agency.8 The principles of these doctrines are equally applicable
to delegations of power by legislative bodies of local governments.'
Despite the nondelegation doctrine, in Florida it has long been
held that subject to certain statutory guidelines, administrative ac-
tion may validly entail the exercise of either quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial discretion. 0 However, courts have often had difficulty
in explicitly defining what statutory limitations are necessary for a
delegation of authority to be sufficiently restrictive. One result has
been that in the federal judiciary and in a number of other jurisdic-
1. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides in part: "Branches of government.-The powers of the
state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches."
2. Id.
3. Id. art. III, § 1.
4. Id. art. IV, § 1.
5. Id. art. V, § 1.
6. The definition of "agency" in Florida's Administrative Procedure Act includes the
Governor and all other state officers, departments, departmental units, commissioners, re-
gional planning agencies, boards, districts, and authorities, and other units of government,
including counties and municipalities to the extent that they are made subject to the act "by
general or special law or existing judicial decisions." FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (1977).
7. State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 47 So. 969, 976 (Fla. 1908).
8. In the cases defining the necessary requirements for a delegation of power by the
legislature in Florida, there has been almost no distinction in the standards between delega-
tions of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority. This discussion focuses on the nondele-
gation of legislative power, but the reasoning may be applied equally to the nondelegation of
judicial power.
9. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
10. Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 129 So. 876 (Fla. 1930).
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tions as well, courts have departed from the traditional nondelega-
tion doctrine in favor of the "modern trend" in administrative law.
This trend emphasizes the adequacy of procedural safeguards in the
administrative process in lieu of strict legislative guidelines for exer-
cise of delegated authority." But in Florida, the courts have contin-
ued to adhere to the nondelegation doctrine. Recently, in Askew v.
Cross Key Waterways, the Florida Supreme Court stated that
"until the provisions of Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitu-
tion are altered by the people we deem the doctrine of nondelegation
of legislative power to be viable in this State."'2
Case law on the nondelegation doctrine in Florida essentially be-
gins with the often cited opinion in State v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railway, in which Justice Whitfield wrote that:
The Legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to
declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted discre-
tion in applying a law; but it may enact a law, complete in itself,
designed to accomplish a general public purpose, and may ex-
pressly authorize designated officials within definite valid limita-
tions to provide rules and regulations for the complete operation
and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose."
This statement means that the legislature must establish policies
and set out definite guidelines and standards limiting the exercise
of delegated power." "No matter how laudable a piece of legislation
may be in the minds of its sponsors, objective guidelines and
standards should appear expressly in the act or be within the
realm of reasonable inference from the language of the act where
a delegation of power is involved . "... 5 Once policies and ade-
quate standards are established, the legislature may allow selected
agencies or officials to promulgate subordinate rules or to deter-
mine the facts to which the legislatively declared policy is to apply.
But even when the delegation of power sufficiently restricts agency
discretion for constitutional purposes, an agency's failure to pro-
perly adopt definitive rules may result in the arbitrary exercise of
the delegated power. In such an event, the courts will invalidate the
agency action. 7
11. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMIISTRATvE LAW TREASME § 3.15 (2d ed. 1978).
12. 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978). This case was a consolidation of two appeals from the
First District Court of Appeal: Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977), and Postal Colony Co. v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
13. 47 So. 969, 976 (Fla. 1908).
14. Husband v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 1961).
15. Smith v. Portante, 212 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968).
16. Husband v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 1961).
17. Straughn v. O'Riordan, 338 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1976);
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The requirement of standards to guide the agency in exercising
delegated powers is the essence of the nondelegation doctrine. The
supreme court has stated that "[t]he exact meaning of the require-
ment of a standard has never been fixed. . . .However, when stat-
utes delegate power with inadequate protection against unfairness
or favoritism, and when such protection could easily have been pro-
vided, the reviewing court should invalidate the legislation. '"'8 Addi-
tionally, when agency action is found to go beyond the statutory
guidelines, the courts will invalidate that action, both under Flor-
ida's common law and more recently under the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act.' 9
The courts must ultimately determine whether an administrative
action is within the limits of the delegated authority and whether
those limits are sufficient.20 Statutory limitations will be held un-
constitutional if they contain vague terms. Furthermore, a statute
will be constitutionally invalid if it is excessively broad in scope, so
that no one, including the agency or the courts, can say with cer-
tainty whether agency action exceeds the delegated authority. How-
ever, if the guidelines on the agency's discretion are sufficiently
limiting the sole fact that some "authority, discretion, or judgment"
must necessarily be exercised will not invalidate the statutory dele-
gation of authority.
2'
In Department of Citrus v. Griffin, the Florida Supreme Court
enunciated two tests to determine whether a statute violates the
nondelegation doctrine: first, could the legislature.make any trans-
fer of authority at all; and second, if so, was the transfer accompa-
nied by sufficiently restrictive guidelines on actions of the adminis-
trative agency? 22 "[T]hese tests must be tempered by due consider-
ation for the practical context of the problem sought to be remedied,
or the policy sought to be effected, ' 23 but the delegation must leave




A bifurcated analysis of statutory guidelines facilitates an appro-
priate examination of the second test enunciated in Griffin. The
first consideration is whether the guidelines sufficiently limit
agency action by specifying which elements or factors must be pres-
ent before the delegated authority can be properly exercised. When
18. Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1969).
19. 1 A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL 5 (1979). The
Administrative Procedure Act is embodied in FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1977).
20. Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1968).
21. Id.
22. 239 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1970).
23. Id.
24. Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1969).
1979]
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the guidelines fail to delineate these elements or factors, leaving this
fundamental act of policy setting to the agency, that delegation of
authority is unconstitutional.
25
Assuming that the guidelines sufficiently specify the elements or
factors limiting the agency's authority to act,2" the second consider-
ation is how the stipulated elements or factors are modified by
quantitative terms that are susceptible of a reasonable and foresee-
able definition.2 7 For example, a hypothetical statute could author-
ize agency action to regulate "excessive" noise levels for the protec-
tion of workers in particular industries. In such a statute, the stipu-
lated limiting element for action is the regulation of "noise levels
for the protection of workers in particular industries." The unde-
fined quantitative term "excessive" modifies the stipulated ele-
ment, but the determination of what constitutes an "excessive"
level of noise is left to the agency's discretion. Thus, the question is
whether the term "excessive" prevents unforeseeable or arbitrary
agency action in fleshing out the regulatory framework.
Guidelines may appropriately specify which elements or factors
are necessary for agency action, while allowing the agency to inter-
pret the modifying quantitative terms. 8 These terms indicate when
the necessary element for agency action crosses the quantitative
threshold of legislative concern, so as to allow the agency to exercise
its delegated authority. Procedural safeguards on the agency's de-
termination of the required quantities of each element bolster the
probability that these guidelines will be found to be constitutional. 21
An examination of recent Florida case law illustrates how the first
consideration of the preceding analysis has been applied by the
courts in passing on the constitutionality of statutory delegations of
power. In Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 3 the court found that a statu-
tory provision prohibiting "unfair trade practices" as related to cel-
ery and sweet corn markets lacked sufficient guidelines to be a
constitutional delegation of authority. The court determined that
25. See, e.g., Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 918-19.
26. When ambiguous language is used in delegating power, guidelines will still be suffi-
ciently restrictive if the language has become defined through common law, trade usage, or
federal law (if the legislative intent so indicated). D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164,
167 (Fla. 1977); Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 213 (Fla. 1968).
27. See Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d at 919.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Albrecht v. Department of Envt'l Reg., 353 So. 2d 883, 886-87 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977). These procedural safeguards include an evidentiary hearing for persons
affected by an agency action, and an opportunity for judicial review of the agency action. See
FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1977). For a comparison of Florida's Administrative Procedure Act before
and after its substantial amendment in 1975, see Note, Rulemaking and Adjudication Under
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 755 (1975).
30. 216 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1968).
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there was no set meaning in law or common usage for "unfair trade
practices." '3' Therefore, the necessary element for agency action was
inadequately specified.
Conner may be contrasted with Department of Legal Affairs v.
Rogers,3 wherein the court did uphold the constitutionality of a
similar delegation of authority. The delegated authority allowed
agency action to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce." ' The court found that the
statute was valid because it specified that in construing the phrase
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices," great weight was to be given
to federal interpretations of that phrase as it is used in section
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.34 Thus, the statutory
reference to federal law provided the necessary guidelines to deter-
mine which elements must be present for the exercise of delegated
authority.3
In Harrington & Co. v. Tampa Port Authority,3 the supreme
court considered the constitutionality of a statute which authorized
state port authorities to "grant such number of licenses to compe-
tent and trustworthy persons to act as stevedores . . .as it may
deem necessary, having due regard to the business of the port and
harbor.3 1 In reviewing the Tampa Port Authority's denial of an
applicant's request for a stevedore's license, the court struck down
the statute because the legislature had provided no guidelines to
ensure that those selected for licensing as stevedores were not arbi-
trarily chosen. The standards of trustworthiness .and competence
were inadequate to guard against arbitrary licensing since many
more people would meet those requirements than the number of
licenses actually granted. 3 '
In Gainesville-Alachua County Regional Utilities Board v. Clay
Electric Cooperative, Inc.,39 a statute which authorized the Public
Service Commission to resolve territorial disputes between electric
utility companies was found to contain adequate standards on the
31. Id. at 213.
32. 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
33. FLA. STAT. § 501.204 (1977).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
35. 329 So. 2d at 265.
36. 358 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1978).
37. Ch. 73-206, § 11, 1973 Fla. Laws 466 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 311.021 (1977)).
38. 358 So. 2d at 170. Thus, the lack of adequate guidelines left to the agency the legisla-
tive task of establishing which factors must be present for granting of a stevedore's license
other than general trustworthiness and competence. Although the Tampa Port Authority
limited the number of licenses based upon what may have been "due regard to the business
of the port and harbor," there were no real guidelines as to who should. get the licenses that
were granted.
39. 340 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 1976).
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delegation of power. Factors to be considered by the Commission in
resolving territorial disputes as established by the statute were:
the ability of utilities to expand services within their own capabili-
ties and the nature of the area involved, including population and
the degree of urbanization of the area and its proximity to other
urban areas and the present and reasonably foreseeable future
requirements of the area for other utility services.'"
The statute provided the necessary limitation on the exercise of
agency power by stating that "[tihe commission shall further have
jurisdiction over the planning, development, and maintenance of a
coordinated electric power grid throughout Florida to assure an ade-
quate and reliable source of energy for operational and emergency
purposes in Florida and the avoidance of further uneconomic dupli-
cation of generation, transmission, and distribution facilities."4'
Thus, this statute precisely set out which factors were necessary to
invoke and guide the exercise of agency action.
The statutory use of vague or ambiguous language, when that
language is not defined by law or trade usage, can result in unconsti-
tutional guidelines. Such guidelines are so general that they do not
sufficiently limit agency discretion. For example, in D 'Alemberte v.
Anderson,'2 the Florida Supreme Court examined a statute which
made it illegal for a public official to accept any gift "that would
cause a reasonably prudent person to be influenced in the discharge
of official duties."' 3 The court held that since this language was an
ambiguous guideline for gauging a person's mental processes, it was
an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the agency charged
with making that determination."
In contrast to the preceding cases, in Sarasota County v. Barg45
the statutory guidelines clearly delineated which elements or factors
were necessary for agency action. Accordingly, the judicial focus was
upon how the legislatively stipulated elements or factors were modi-
fied by quantitative terms in the statute. The statute in question
prohibited "undue or unreasonable dredging, filling or disturbance
40. FLA. STAT. § 366.04(2)(e) (1977).
41. 340 So. 2d at 1162 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 366.04(3) (1977)) (emphasis supplied by the
court). There is virtually no chance that the agency could exercise its discretion arbitrarily
under the legislative mandate that the duplication of electric facilities is to be avoided in the
development of the state's power grid. The express purpose of the act was properly and
adequately defined.
42. 349 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1977).
43. Ch. 74-177, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 470 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 112.313(2) (1977)).
44. 349 So. 2d at 168. There is no way to determine from the statute which gifts would be
prohibited, leaving open the possibility of arbitrary application of the statute.
45. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
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of submerged bottoms," and "unreasonable destruction of natural
vegetation" which would be "harmful" or which would
"significantly contribute to air and water pollution., "" The supreme
court held that the statute did not contain sufficient guidelines to
be a constitutional delegation of authority to the Manasota Key
Conservation District.47 The court stated that the statute "does not
provide us with any definition of 'undue,' 'unreasonable,' 'harmful,'
or 'significantly contribute.' The [statute] does not contain any
standards or guidelines to aid any court or administrative body in
interpreting these terms."4 Thus, the court deemed that these
quantitative terms were insufficiently defined.
In Cross Key Waterways, the Florida Supreme Court stated that
Barg's "approximations of the threshold of legislative concern"
would not invalidate a similar statute today, partly because of the
protections of the current version of the Administrative Procedure
Act (which were not available at the time of the Barg decision)."
Thus, the supreme court ostensibly overruled Barg. But a few
months after Cross Key Waterways, in Department of Business Reg-
ulation v. National Manufactured Housing Federation, Inc., the
court cited Barg to support a finding that the use of ambiguous
terms in a statute caused the statutory standards to be constitution-
ally insufficient. 50 The statute involved in this case authorized the
Department of Business Regulation, upon petition of fifty-one per-
cent of those mobile home park tenants who would be subjected to
a rate increase, to determine what part of certain enumerated in-
creased costs to the owner of the mobile home park "may be passed
on to the tenants or prospective tenants in the form of increased
rental or service charges if such increases are reasonable and justi-
fied under the facts and circumstances of the particular case
. . . ,5 and are not "unconscionable." 5
Upon first examination of Cross Key Waterways and National
Manufactured Housing there appears to be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two cases with respect to their treatment of Barg. But
on closer examination, the distinction is clear. In Cross Key
Waterways, when the court stated that statutes like those in Barg
would be upheld today, the court was speaking of statutory guide-
lines which specify exactly what factors must be present to invoke
46. Ch. 71-904, 1971 Fla. Laws 1581 (uncodified).
47. 302 So. 2d at 742-43.
48. Id. at 742.
49. 372 So. 2d at 919.
50. 370 So. 2d 1132, 1136 (Fla. 1979).
51. FLA. STAT. § 83.784(2)(a) (1977).
52. Id. § 83.784(1)(a) (1977).
1979]
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the statute's operation, but which leave the fleshing out of the requi-
site quantitative terms (e.g., "undue" or "excessive") to the
agency.53 However, in National Manufactured Housing, the ambigu-
ous terms in the statute allowed the Department of Business Regu-
lation to determine on a case-by-case basis what factors should be
present to allow a mobile home park owner to pass increased costs
on to his tenants. The determination of what factors or elements
must be present to invoke the operation of a statute is fundamental
policy setting and must be performed by the legislature. In contrast,
the agency action of fleshing out the requisite quantitative terms
modifying each factor may be permissible under Cross Key
Waterways, at least when done within the procedural requirements
of the present Administrative Procedure Act.54 The supreme court's
approval of this aspect of agency action is probably the most signifi-
cant feature of Cross Key Waterways.
The above analysis is supported by an analogy to the decision of
the First District Court of Appeal in Albrecht v. Department of
Environmental Regulation. 5 The statute at issue in that case re-
quired review of fill applications by the appropriate board of county
commissioners. This board must determine whether the proposed
fill operation would violate the law, alter the natural flow of naviga-
ble waters, create erosion, cause stagnant areas, damage adjoining
land, or detrimentally affect wildlife or marine life to "such an
extent as to be contrary to the public interest."56 Before a fill permit
could be issued, the county commission's findings, together with a
biological survey, an ecological study, and in some cases a hydro-
graphic survey, must have been reviewed by the Department of
Environmental Regulation. 7 The court in Albrecht stated that the
statutory guidelines, in conjunction with procedural safeguards
imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, sufficiently limited
the delegation of power. The court noted that the "determination
of each application for a fill permit involves complicated decisions
which cannot intelligently be guided by specific or quantitative
statutory standards.'' s
53. In Barg, the statute at issue specified which elements must be present for the statute
to operate: i.e., "dredging, filling or disturbance of submerged bottoms," and "destruction
of natural vegetation." The only controversy related to quantitative terms modifying the
elements: i.e., "undue," "unreasonable," "harmful," and "significantly contribute to air and
water pollution." 302 So. 2d at 742.
54. See Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 919.
55. 353 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
56. FtA. STAT. § 253.124(2) (1977).
57. Id. § 253.124(3).
58. 353 So. 2d at 886. The statute set out exactly what factors must be present for the
Department of Environmental Regulation to deny a fill application, but left the fleshing out
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In reaching its decision in Albrecht, the court focused on the
phrase "to such an extent as to be contrary to public interest." The
court implicitly recognized that "to such an extent" was a quantita-
tive term that was incapable of precise legislative definition. How-
ever, by specifying what factors the agency must consider, the statu-
tory guidelines for agency action sufficiently limited agency discre-
tion in determining when a proposed fill operation would be con-
trary to the public interest. 5
An examination of the cases discussed indicates that when the
requirements for a constitutional delegation are met through basic
policy setting by the legislature and by adequate guidelines on ad-
ministrative discretion, then the policy may properly be " 'fleshed
out' by administrative action to meet changing circumstances
. ... 60 This is both practically necessary and clearly permissible."'
In Cross Key Waterways, the Florida Supreme Court further clar-
ified the distinction between legislative policy setting and the dele-
gation of power to "flesh out" the articulated policy. The court also
laid to rest any doubt that the nondelegation doctrine would not
remain viable in Florida by affirmatively announcing that Florida
would not follow the so-called "modern trend" in administrative
law, which focuses upon procedural safeguards in the administra-
tive process rather than on strict legislative guidelines on agency
action." In so doing, the court struck down two designations by the
Administration Commissions3 of Areas of Critical State Concern.',
The process for establishing an Area of Critical State Concern (an
Area) is outlined in the Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act of 1972 (the Act).5 5 This Act represented the legislature's
of the requisite quantitative terms of each factor to the Department. This fleshing out may
be accomplished by the Department through rulemaking, or to the extent that the statutory
standards are not refined in the rules, the Department must explain the policy behind each
decision to grant or deny a permit. Id. The statute also provided that the Department shall
"consider any other factors affecting the public interests." FLA. STAT. § 253.124(2) (1977). In
Albrecht, the court declined to consider whether that provision would allow the Department
to consider any factors other than those listed in the statute. 353 So. 2d at 885. If the statute
were found to allow the Department to issue or deny permits based upon factors other than
those listed in the statute, that portion of the statute would be an unlawful delegation of
authority under the analysis of this paper.
59. 353 So. 2d at 886.
60. Rogers, 329 So. 2d at 269 (England, J., concurring).
61. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 919.
62. Id. at 924-25.
63. The Administration Commission is composed of the Governor and Cabinet. FLA. STAT.
§ 380.031(1) (1977).
64. The Green Swamp and Florida Keys Areas of Critical State Concern were invalidated.
These Areas of Critical State Concern were established pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1977).
65. This Act also established the Development of Regional Impact process which may be
invoked for certain developments that would have a substantial effect on more than one
county. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1977). The Act follows almost verbatim the American Law
19791
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response to the constitutional mandate for protection of the state's
natural resources." To effectuate the purposes of the Act, a portion
of land regulatory powers previously delegated to local governments
was redelegated by the legislature to the Administration Commis-
sion. 7
The legislature attempted, through the Act, to delegate to the
Administration Commission two distinct authorities: first, the au-
thority to identify and designate Areas of Critical State Concern;",
and second, the authority to determine land development controls
for the designated areas."' The first of these two powers was declared
unconstitutional by the supreme court due to inadequate guidelines
for the agency's exercise of power.7" However, the court implicitly
found the second delegation to be constitutionally proper.7'
The supreme court found that the guidelines for designating an
Area were constitutionally inadequate.72 These guidelines consisted
of whether an Area has a "significant impact upon environmental,
Institute's Model Land Development Code. See ALl, A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE
(1975). Tentative Draft No. 3 of the Model Act actually served as the pattern followed by
the Florida Legislature.
66. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 914. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 provides: "Natural
resources and scenic beauty.-It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abate-
ment of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise."
67. Rhodes, The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act: The First
Operational Year, 49 FLA. B.J. 214 (1975). The First District Court of Appeal was concerned
that such a redelegation was offensive to the tradition of local control of land use regulations.
Nonetheless, even that court recognized the legality of it, when accompanied by adequate
standards, since the Florida Constitution does not prohibit such state reclamation of regula-
tory power and reassignment of that power to state agencies through legislation. The power
exercised by local governments was delegated by the state in the first instance, and the state
could appropriately redelegate that power to another agency. Cross Key Waterways v. Askew,
351 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd,372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
68. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1)-(2) (1977). An Area of Critical State Concern may be desig-
nated only if it is:
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environmental,
historical, natural, or archaeological resources of regional or statewide importance.
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, an
existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public investment.
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which may include a pro-
posed site of a new community, designated in a state land development plan.
Id. § 380.052(2). Additional restrictions on the designation of Areas are: no more than five
percent of the state's land area may be under supervision as Areas of Critical State Concern,
id. § 380.05(17); no rule may be adopted which would provide for a moratorium on develop-
ment in the Area, id. § 380.05(1)(b); and no rule may limit the vested or other legal rights of
persons within the Area nor interfere with the right to complete any development that has
been authorized by registration of a subdivision under FLA. STAT. § 478 (1977), id. §
380.05(15).
69. Id. § 380.05(5)-(15).
70. 372 So. 2d at 919.
71. Id. at 920.
72. Id. at 925.
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historical, natural, or archaeological resources of regional or state-
wide importance" and whether the Area is "significantly affected
by," or has "a significant effect upon, an existing or proposed major
public facility or other area of major public investment."73
The court stressed that the designation process was not deficient
because of the statutory quantitative terms "significant impact,"
"significantly affected by," or "significant effect upon."74 Instead,
the court held that "[tihe deficiency in the legislation here consid-
ered is the absence of legislative delineation.of priorities among
competing areas and resources which require protection in the State
interest,"' since the "Act treats alike, as fungible goods, disparate
categories of environmental, historical, natural and archaeological
resources of regional or statewide importance," and gives no clue as
to what is to be considered a "major public investment."75
Despite its holding in Cross Key Waterways, the court looked
with favor on an alternative scheme of designation of Areas by the
legislature, as exemplified by the Big Cypress Area of Critical State
Concern,76 which left to the Administration Commission the task of
"fleshing out" the legislative policy through adoption of land devel-
opment regulations.77 The court also noted with approval a scheme
which would utilize legislative ratification of proposed administra-
tive designations of Areas.78 Subsequently, however, the court indi-
cated that the legislature should not be limited exclusively to these
two alternatives to avoid violating the nondelegation doctrine. The
legislature might develop a different scheme-as long as the consti-
tutional tests could be met.79
73. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(a), .05(2)(b) (1977). The guideline established by §
380.05(2)(c), as to whether the proposed area was "of major development potential," was not.
considered by the court because it was not used in either designation of these Areas of Critical
State Concern. Furthermore, that guideline depends upon a legislatively approved state
comprehensive plan which includes additional specific criteria for the operation of this guide-
line. See 372 So. 2d at 919-20.
74. 372 So. 2d at 919. These are legislatively fixed approximations of when each element
or factor will be sufficient to allow the agency to designate an Area. Such quantitative
approximations may be properly used in a statute delegating authority to an administrative
agency.
75. Id. (quoting Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977)) (footnotes omitted). Since any of these diverse categories may justify designation
of an Area, it is impossible to say which elements are necessary for a designation. To uphold
this provision as an adequate guideline would be to allow the Administration Commission to
act according to whim. See Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1969).
76. This Area was established pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 380.055 (1977).
77. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 920. This judicial perspective indicates that the
second part of the Area of Critical State Concern process, i.e., the authority to determine the
land development controls for the areas designated, contains sufficient guidelines to meet the
tests for constitutionality.
78. Id. at 925.
79. See id. at 926.
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While the Florida Supreme Court continues to adhere to the doc-
trine of the nondelegation of power, the doctrine's significance has
been considerably eroded in the federal judiciary and in a number
of other jurisdictions as well. The leading proponent of this move-
ment away from the nondelegation doctrine and its requirement of
strict legislative standards on agency discretion is Professor Ken-
neth Davis: He believes that the nondelegation doctrine has no
place in modern government, primarily because administrative
agencies have an increasingly important function in the daily opera-
tions of government."'
One argument against the nondelegation doctrine is that strict
legislative guidelines on delegations of power impede the adminis-
trative process and decrease governmental efficiency. Conversely,
the "modern trend" in administrative law is a relaxation of the
legislative-standards requirement in favor of an analysis focusing
upon procedural due process safeguards on administrative actions.
This shift in focus would still protect against the possibility of ad-
ministrative caprice and yet allow greater latitude in agency actions
to meet the constantly changing needs of the public.8' Such a relaxa-
tion of the nondelegation doctrine is theoretically proper, Davis
claims, because the constitutional grant of legislative power is only
initially made in the legislature, which may in turn delegate any
portion it desires.
2
The "modern trend" in administrative law is premised upon the
belief that administrative agencies are repositories of expertise in
certain specialized fields which cannot adequately be dealt with in
detail by the legislature or the courts. 3 The experience and intuitive
impressions of these administrative experts, especially in the field
of economic regulation, are inarticulable in the form of precise
standards. Nonetheless, the collective administrative experience is
important for the exercise of governmental functions. Therefore,
agency discretion should not be hampered by strict adherence to the
legislative-standards requirement on delegations of power. Proce-
dural safeguards on the administrative process are designed to pre-
vent abuse of administrative discretion. 4 Furthermore, Davis states
four reasons why the legislature cannot form all major policy deci-
sions into a statute which delegates power to an administrative
agency:
80. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 11, at § 3.15.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 2.4.
83. Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws, and
Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 449 (1977).
84. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 11, at § 2.12.
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(1) No matter how expert their helpers may be, legislators are
less than omniscient and usually are wise, when they establish an
agency, to attempt no more than to legislate broad frameworks for
administrative policy-making. (2) Problems of policy are often
beyond the highest expertness, so that meaningful answers have to
come from focusing on facts and circumstances of concrete cases,
limiting the decision to a single set of facts, and leaving the policy
open for other circumstances. (3) A legislative body is ill-equipped
to resolve controversies of named parties; that function usually
calls for court procedure or for the adjudicative procedure of an
agency. (4) Even questions suitable for legislative determination
are often delegated for some such reason as failure of legislators to
agree, preference of legislators to compromise disagreements by
tossing the problem to administrators, draftsmanship which is in-
tentionally or unintentionally vague or contradictory, or some
combination of such factors. 5
However, it has become painfully clear to another commentator
that administrative agencies quickly identify with the very interests
which they regulate.86 Accordingly, the agencies become ineffective
at protecting the "public interest," despite well-meant procedural
safeguards. 7 More importantly, as Judge J. Skelly Wright has ob-
served, a broad delegation of power will yield one of two undesirable
results: "On the one hand, if the problem is really intractable, it is
unlikely that the agency, with all its expertise, will do any better
.. .[than the legislature]. Alternatively, it is possible that the
agency will be able to deal with the problem forcefully." 8 In the
latter event, however, any administrative accomplishments are
achieved at the expense of democracy (to the extent that there are
any accomplishments at all). An administrative accomplishment is
effected by appointed bureaucrats-not by the elected representa-
tives of the people, who would be more likely to truly safeguard the
"public interest.''88 Furthermore, administrative accomplishments
achieved under a broad delegation of power are especially damaging
to the democratic ideal when the delegation of power is made be-
cause there is no legislative consensus to facilitate the formulation
of specific standards for agency action.
Florida's courts have recognized the inherent value of legislatively
controlled policy formulations. The state's courts have maintained
the "basic philosophy of democracy" by their adherence to the non-
85. Id. at § 2.12.
86. Schwartz, supra note 83.
87. Id. at 456.
88. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 585-86 (1972).
89. Id.
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delegation doctrine and the concurrent requirement of strict stand-
ards on delegations of power.'0
In other jurisdictions with statutes that provide for the designa-
tion of particular Areas in order to control their development, sev-
eral statutes have been unsuccessfully attacked on the basis of the
nondelegation doctrine. However, in each of those cases, the guide-
lines on designation of Areas by administrative agencies were con-
siderably more restrictive than the Florida statute, with the legisla-
tures in those states taking a larger role in the designations." Thus,
a California statute required that any development within a speci-
fied "coastal zone" must be approved by a regional planning coun-
cil, upon a finding that "the development will not have any substan-
tial adverse environmental or ecological effect." This statute was
upheld against attack under the nondelegation doctrine. 2 In enact-
ing that statute, the California Legislature had delineated a narrow
"coastal zone" as the area in which the statute was to operate and
provided additional guidelines on the further restriction of the Area
controlled by the statute.9
3
Likewise, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a statute
which provided for regulation of all fresh water wetlands by the
director of the Department of Natural Resources and the municipal-
ity in which the wetlands were located. 4 The court emphasized the
fact that "the director is given jurisdiction over only a very limited
area, wetlands. The term 'wetlands' is precisely defined . . .
The court also cited an earlier Rhode Island case upholding a dele-
gation of authority, stating that "we placed great weight on the fact
that the administrative agency was given discretion to act only in a
well defined geographical area."" This same reasoning contributed
to the upholding of the validity of a New Jersey statute which regu-
lated development within a statutorily defined "coastal area"'7 and
a Massachusetts statute which regulated development on Martha's
Vineyard (a geographic area of Massachusetts expressly delineated
by the statute).8
The important common element of the statutes above, which dif-
90. Martin, The Delegation Issue in Administrative Law-Florida vs. Federal, 53 FLA.
BAR J. 35, 39 (1979).
91. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 920-22.
92. CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 330
(4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 352 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1976).
95. Id. at 666.
96. Id.
97. Toms River Affiliates v. Department of Envt'l Protection, 355 A.2d 679 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976).
98. Island Properties, Inc. v. Martha's Vineyard Comm'n, 361 N.E. 2d 385 (Mass. 1977).
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ferentiates them from the Florida statute at issue in Cross Key
Waterways, is that each statute designated a well-defined geo-
graphic area in which development was to be controlled. Therefore,
there was no problem with standards on the delegation of power to
designate the Areas, since that power had not been delegated. How-
ever, there may still be a problem in those states with regard to the
delegation of the power to determine exactly what the development
controls should be within the designated Areas. But for purposes of
this discussion, the important consideration is that the courts above
were influenced by the legislative delineation of the geographic
areas and thus implicitly recognized the value of the standards re-
quirement of the nondelegation doctrine.
The Florida Legislature, reacting quickly to the holding in Cross
Key Waterways, has formulated a designation process which is simi-
lar to the foregoing legislative schemes for the control and develop-
ment of certain geographic areas. At a special session in December
1978, the legislature adopted a bill, to be effective through the next
regular session, to legislatively designate the two Areas of Critical
State Concern which had been invalidated by the court's decision 9
At the 1979 regular session, the legislature passed a comprehensive
amendment to the Area of Critical State Concern designation pro-
cess, which should rectify the constitutional problems of the earlier
version of the process.'00
In the 1979 amendment to the designation process, guidelines as
to what areas could be designated by the Administration Commis-
sion were greatly expanded. The general types of categories of areas
and resources to be protected by the Act are much the
same-environmental or natural resources of regional or statewide
importance, historical or archaeological resources, and areas having
significant impact upon, or being significantly impacted by, major
public facilities or investments. However, within each of these types
of categories, the legislature has refined the guidelines such that
only the most important resources or areas within each category
would warrant protection under the Act.'0' This refinement is signif-
icant because, contrary to the previous legislative failure to delin-
eate priorities among the disparate competing resources and areas,
the new guidelines more narrowly define the areas that can be con-
sidered for designation.
Also, under the amended version of the Act, any rule adopted by
the Administration Commission designating an Area of Critical
99. Fla. HB 3A (1979).
100. Fla. HB 1150 (1979).
101. Id. § 4.
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State Concern must be submitted with a detailed report to the
legislature prior to the next regular session. The legislature may
then reject, modify, or take no action relative to the rule.0 2 Although
the Administration Commission under the new scheme would still
adopt land development regulations to guide development in an
Area, no such regulation would become effective prior to legislative
review of the Area designation. 03 Finally, in the amendment, the
legislature specifically adopted the Green Swamp Area'04 and the
Florida Keys Area'05 as Areas of Critical State Concern for an indefi-
nite time. There can be no doubt that these legislative designations,
together with the older designation of the Big Cypress Area of Criti-
cal State Concern, ' meet the necessary constitutional require-
ments., 07
The Cross Key Waterways decision is an excellent example of the
benefits of the nondelegation of legislative power doctrine as applied
by Florida's courts. The court, in its review of designations of Areas
of Critical State Concern by the Administration Commission, deter-
mined that the legislative guidelines on the exercise of delegated
power left too much unbridled discretion to the agency. In fact, the
court concluded that the standards were so insufficient that it could
not determine whether the designations made by the Administra-
tion Commission complied with the guidelines. Therefore, the court
declared that part of the statute unconstitutional. The legislature
then took immediate action to review those designations made by
the Administration Commission and to redesignate them as Areas
of Critical State Concern after concluding that they were indeed
within the scope of the types of areas that the legislature had origi-
nally intended to be protected by the Act. The legislature also re-
fined the guidelines on designations of Areas by the Administration
Commission to eliminate the objections that the supreme court had
regarding the possibility of abuse of discretion in making those des-
ignations. This legislative action resulted in a much stronger statute
for the protection of the public interest in designations of Areas of
102. Id.
103. Id. Since the requirement for the land development regulations is review of the Area
designation by the legislature, rather than affirmative ratification of the designation, this
legislative acquiescence, in itself, would not have been sufficient to save the designation
process from constitutional infirmity. Additional guidelines are necessary to determine which
areas could be designated.
104. Fla. HB 1150 § 5 (1979).
105. Id. § 6.
106. The Big Cypress Area of Critical State Concern was established pursuant to FLA.
STAT. § 380.055 (1977).
107. The Florida Supreme Court has stated quite clearly that the legislature may always
make these Area designations itself since there would be no delegation of power in such a
legislative designation. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 925.
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Critical State Concern without sacrificing the benefits from those
designations already made or scheduled to be made. In the future,
even the short-term inconveniences of a decision like Cross Key
Waterways can be avoided when the legislature meets its responsi-
bilities as the state's policy setting body by restricting the power
delegated to agencies through use of clear guidelines and standards
on agency discretion which specify exactly what factors the agency
must consider in its exercise of the delegated authority.

